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Do agricultural subsidies crowd out or 
stimulate rural credit institutions? 





In this paper we estimate the impact of subsidies from the EU’s common agricultural policy on farm 
bank loans. According to the theoretical results, if subsidies are paid at the beginning of the growing 
season they may reduce bank loans, whereas if they are paid at the end of the season they increase 
bank loans, but these results are conditional on whether farms are credit constrained and on the 
relative cost of internal and external financing. In the empirical analysis, we use farm-level panel data 
from the Farm Accountancy Data Network to test the theoretical predictions for the period 1995–
2007. We employ fixed-effects and generalised method of moment models to estimate the impact of 
subsidies on farm loans. The results suggest that subsidies influence farm loans and the effects tend to 
be non-linear and indirect. The results also indicate that both coupled and decoupled subsidies 
stimulate long-term loans, but the long-term loans of large farms increase more than those of small 
farms, owing to decoupled subsidies. Furthermore, the results imply that short-term loans are affected 
only by decoupled subsidies, and they are altered by decoupled subsidies more for small farms than for 
large farms; however, when controlling for endogeneity, only the decoupled payments affect loans and 
the relationship is non-linear. 
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1.  Introduction 
Agricultural subsidies have important impacts on agricultural markets. Besides affecting 
farmers’ incomes, studies have shown that agricultural subsidies distort input and output 
markets and thus alter the rents of other agents active in the agricultural sector (for example, 
consumers or input suppliers). The impact of agricultural subsidies on income distributional 
effects depends on their type, the structure of the markets and the existence of market 
imperfections (Alston and James, 2002; de Gorter and Meilke, 1989; Gardner, 1983; 
Guyomard, Mouël and Gohin, 2004; Salhofer, 1996; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Studies also 
evaluate, among other things, the effects of subsidies on the environment and agricultural 
public goods (e.g. Beers Van Cees and Van Den Bergh, 2001; Khanna, Isik and Zilberman, 
2002) as well as productivity and market distortions (e.g. Chau and de Gorter, 2005; 
Goodwin and Mishra, 2006; Sckokai and Moro, 2006). 
With a few exceptions (e.g. Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009), most of these studies investigate the 
direct impacts of subsidies (on prices, quantities, income, the environment, etc.) by assuming 
that subsidies do not alter the structure of agricultural markets and do not interact with 
market institutions. In reality, government policies may have various unintended effects. 
They can change the structure of the market organisation or crowd out some market 
institutions. An analysis of such effects goes beyond the focus of the current literature on 
agricultural policy analysis. Yet these issues are related to the ‘crowding-out effects’ of other 
types of government programmes, which are extensively analysed in the literature. For 
example, the interaction between private transfers and public welfare programmes has 
attracted considerable attention in academic studies (e.g. Barro, 1974; Lampman and 
Smeeding, 1983; Roberts, 1984; Maitra and Ray, 2003; Cox, Hansen and Jimenez, 2004). 
The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of the EU’s common agricultural policy 
(CAP) on farm bank loans. First, extending the models of Feder (1985), Carter and Wiebe 
(1990) and Ciaian and Swinnen (2009), we theoretically analyse how subsidies may affect 
farm loans. Then, employing unique, farm-level panel data from the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN) for the period 1995–2007, we empirically estimate the interaction between 
CAP subsidies and farm loans. To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first attempts to 
study empirically how agricultural subsidies affect rural credit institutions. 
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2.  The model  
We build the theoretical framework of the present study on the model of Feder (1985), Carter 
and Wiebe (1990), and Ciaian and Swinnen (2009). Feder (1985) and Carter and Wiebe 
(1990) analyse farm production behaviour under credit constraints in developing countries, 
while Ciaian and Swinnen (2009) study how a credit constraint impacts on the income 
distributional effects of area payments. In this study we extend the three models by analysing 
how subsidies affect farm demand for bank loans. 
We consider a representative profit-maximising farm. The farm output is a function of the 
fixed amount of land (A), the fixed quantity of family labour (F)1 and non-land inputs (K ), 
which we refer to as ‘fertilizer’ but which also captures other capital inputs used by the farm. 
The production function is represented by a constant returns-to-scale production technology 
) , , ( F K A f  with  0 > i f ,  0 < ii f ,  0 > ij f , for i, j = A, K, F. We assume that all land is owned 
by the farm. End-of-season profit is  K k F K A pf c − = ∏ ) , , ( , where  k i k c c ) 1 ( + = , p is the 
price of the final product, k  is the per-unit price of fertilizer and  c i  is the interest rate. We 
assume that the economy is small and open, which implies that the fertilizer price, the 
interest rate and the output price are fixed. 
An important issue is the timing of various activities and payments. We assume that fertilizer 
is paid for at the beginning of the production season, whereas the revenue from the sale of 
production is collected after harvest at the end of the season. Because of the time lag between 
the payment for fertilizer (variable inputs) and obtaining revenues from the sale of 
production, the farm has a demand for short-term credit. The demand for credit can be 
satisfied either internally (by cash flow, savings and subsidies) or externally (by a bank loan 
or trade credit). For the sake of simplicity we consider only external financing through a bank 
loan and later on in the paper also a subsidy.2 The demand for credit might not be fully 
satisfied, which means that the farm could be credit constrained. As in Ciaian and Swinnen 
(2009), the short-term credit constraint implies that the farm may be constrained with 
respect to the use of fertilizer, that is, the credit constraint may prevent the farm from using 
the optimal amount of fertilizer.  
2.1  Perfect credit markets  
To establish a point of comparison, we first identify the equilibrium without a credit 
constraint. With perfect credit markets, the farm is not constrained on the quantity of input it 
uses. The farm chooses the quantity of fertilizer that maximises its profit given by equation 0. 
This implies the equilibrium condition of 
  c K k pf = . (1) 
In equilibrium, the marginal value product of fertilizer is equal to its price. The condition 0 
determines the fertilizer demand function of the farm. Total fertilizer demand is represented 
by function  K D  in Figure 1. Because we assume that both the fertilizer price and the interest 
rate are fixed, the supply of fertilizer is the horizontal curve, S . The equilibrium quantity of 
fertilizer with no credit constraint is 
* K . 
2.2  Imperfect credit markets 
It is assumed that the maximum amount of money that the farm can borrow from the bank  
(C ) for fertilizer purchase depends on the farm’s collateral (W ) .  A g a i n ,  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  
                                                        
1 The assumption of a fixed amount of land and family labour is not strictly needed to obtain the 
results. We introduce this assumption to simplify the exposition of the model results. 
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simplicity, we consider that banks accept only assets as collateral.3 That is,  () W C C = , where 
0 > dW dC . The credit constraint is given by 
  ) (W C kK ≤ . (2) 
With a credit constraint, the farm maximises the end-of-season profit given by equation 0, 
subject to the credit constraint 0. This amounts to solving the Lagrangean function: 
  ( ) C kK K k F K A pf c c − − − = Ψ λ ) , , (  (3) 
where  c λ  is the shadow price of the credit constraint.  
When the credit constraint is binding,  0 > c λ , the farm cannot use the unconstrained 
optimal level of fertilizer and the quantity demanded of fertilizer is determined by 
k W C K ) ( = . The optimality conditions are the following: 
  ( ) 0 1 = + + − k i pf c c K λ  (4) 
  0 ≤ −C kK . (5) 
From equation 0 it follows that the marginal value product of fertilizer is higher than the 
marginal cost of fertilizer  c k :  c K k pf > . By increasing fertilizer use the farm could increase its 
profit but the credit constraint does not allow it to buy additional fertilizer. The more credit 
constrained the farm is, the less fertilizer it can use, and hence the lower its productivity 
level. 
In Figure 1, the credit-constraint curve (i.e. fertilizer supply), represented in terms of 
fertilizer units, is given by the bold line  c k A K S , where  k C SK = . With the credit constraint, 
the equilibrium use of fertilizer is equal to
*
c K . At 
*
c K  the fertilizer supply curve is vertical, as 
determined by the credit-constraint condition 0. Under a credit constraint, the farm uses less 
fertilizer than it would in a situation of perfect competition, 
* * K Kc < . 
3.  Subsidies and credit constraint 
We define DS as the decoupled subsidy that the farm receives irrespective of its level of 
production. With the subsidy, the objective function of the farm becomes  
  DS K k K k F K A pf s s c c + − − = ∏ ) , , (  (6) 
where  k i k s s ) 1 ( + = ,  c K  is the fertilizer financed through the bank loan C,  s K  is the fertilizer 
financed by the subsidies DS,  s i  represents the farm’s opportunity cost of the subsidy (i.e. the 
return on the most profitable, alternative investment opportunity), and  s c K K K + = . We 
assume that the cost of the bank loan is higher than the cost of the subsidy,  s c i i > . This 
                                                        
3 Again, this assumption is not strictly needed to obtain the results. In reality, the level of farm credit 
may depend on farm characteristics (e.g. reputation, owned assets and profitability). In general, the 
evidence from the literature shows that these factors are important determinants of farm credit (e.g. 
Benjamin and Phimister, 2002; Petrick and Latruffe, 2003; Latruffe, 2005; Briggeman, Towe and 
Morehart, 2009). For example, Latruffe (2005) finds in the case of Poland that farmers with more 
tangible assets and with more owned land were less credit constrained than others. Briggeman, Towe 
and Morehart (2009) find for farm and non-farm sole proprietorships in the US that the probability of 
being denied credit is reduced by, among other factors, net worth, income, the value of assets and 
subsidies.  4 | CIAIAN & POKRIVCAK 
 
assumption is reasonable given the information and incentive problems involved in providing 
a loan to the farm.  
Subsidies affect not only the profit function but also the credit constraint. If the farm receives 
the subsidy at the beginning of the season, it can use it to pay for the fertilizer. Receiving the 
subsidies at the end of the season also improves the farm’s access to credit. Future 
guaranteed payments of subsidies might serve as collateral for obtaining a loan from the bank 
(Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Therefore, the subsidy may alleviate the credit constraint of the 
farm irrespective of the timing of the subsidy.  
With a subsidy, a credit constraint is given by the following inequalities:   
  [ ] DS DS W C kK α α + − + ≤ ) 1 (  (7) 
  DS kKs α ≤  (8) 
where  α  i s  a  d u m m y  v a r i a b l e  t a k i n g  t h e  v a l u e  z e r o  w h e n  t h e  f a r m  u s e s  i t s  s u b s i d y  t o  
purchase fertilizer directly or one when the subsidy improves access to fertilizer indirectly 
through the enhanced value of collateral. 
Equation 0 thus implies that the farm can use two sources to finance the purchase of 
fertilizer: subsidy,  DS α , and/or the bank loan,  [ ] DS W C ) 1 ( α − + . If the subsidy is paid at the 
beginning of the season,  1 = α , the farm can use it to alleviate its credit constraint. On the 
other hand, when the subsidy is paid at the end of the season,  0 = α , the farm may use it as 
collateral to obtain a bank loan. In other words, the subsidy increases farm assets, improves 
its creditworthiness and enhances access to bank loans. Equation 0 states that the use of 
subsidy for the purchase of fertilizer cannot exceed the total value of subsidies DS. 
With subsidies and a credit constraint, the objective function of the farm is represented by 
the following Lagrangean function: 
  [ ] { }( ) DS kK DS DS W C kK K k K k F K A pf s s c s s c c α λ α α λ − − − − − − − − − = Ψ ) 1 ( ) , , (  (9) 
where  s λ  is the shadow price of the subsidy constraint 0.  
The optimality conditions are given by 
  ( ) 0 1 = + + − k i pf c c K λ  (10) 
  ( ) 0 1 = + + − k i pf s s K λ  (11) 
  [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ≤ − − − − DS DS W C kK α α  (12) 
  0 ≤ − DS kKs α . (13) 
3.1  The impact of a decoupled subsidy 
First, we consider the impact of a decoupled subsidy on the bank loan under the condition of 
a perfect credit market. Then we analyse the credit-constraint case. We summarise our 
results from testing three hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: If farms are not credit constrained and if financing through bank loans is 
more expensive than financing through subsidies, subsidies reduce the amount of farms’ 
bank loans if they are paid at the beginning of the season; otherwise, subsidies do not affect 
the farm loans. 
If financing through the bank loan is more expensive than financing through the subsidy, 
s c i i >  (i.e.  s c k k > ), the subsidy can reduce the amount of the bank loan but only in the case DO AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES CROWD OUT OR STIMULATE RURAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS? | 5 
 
when the subsidy is paid at the beginning of the season. In such a case, the farm can use the 
subsidy instead of the bank loan to buy fertilizer. This situation is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 2. With no credit constraint and with no subsidies, the equilibrium fertilizer use is 
* K  
and all fertilizer is financed through the bank loan. The availability of cheaper financing 
through subsidy DS allows the farm to reduce the amount of bank loans. The farm will use 
loans less and some of the fertilizer will be financed with the subsidy, equal to 
*
s K  ( k DS = ). 
The remaining portion of fertilizer, 
* *
s K K − , will be bought with the bank loan. In welfare 
terms the farm gains area a in Figure 2. Note that with the subsidy DS, the equilibrium 
fertilizer use is not affected and remains at 
* K . Only if subsidies crowd out all bank loans, 
which occurs for sufficiently high subsidies (if 
* kK DS > ), does the equilibrium fertilizer use 
increase.  
If the subsidy is paid at the end of the season, the farm cannot use it directly to purchase 
fertilizer. The subsidy can still be used as collateral, however. We assume that the type of 
collateral does not affect the interest rate of the bank loan; hence, the subsidy does not alter 
the equilibrium quantity of loans.4  
Next we analyse the case in which a farm is credit constrained and its subsidy is paid at the 
beginning of the season,  1 = α . 
Hypothesis 2: If farms are credit constrained and if subsidies are paid at the beginning of 
the season, then a) farms will use the same amount of loans with or without subsidies if the 
subsidies are sufficiently small, and b) the farm will reduce bank loans if the subsidies are 
sufficiently high. 
If the subsidy is paid at the beginning of the season, the farm can use it directly to finance the 
purchase of fertilizer. The impact of the subsidy on the bank loan in a situation of credit 
constraint is illustrated in Figure 3. The equilibrium quantity of fertilizer with the credit 
constraint and with no subsidy is 
*
c K . First, consider subsidy  1 DS . The subsidy  1 DS  shifts 
the supply of fertilizer from  c k D K S  to  s k AE 1 K S , where  k DS C SK ) ( 1 1 + = . The equilibrium 
quantity of fertilizer is 
*
1 cs K  ( k DS C ) ( 1 + = ). Some fertilizer is financed directly through the 
subsidy, 
*
1 s K  ( k DS Ks 1
*
1 = ) ,  a n d  t h e  r e s t  i s  f i n a n c e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  b a n k  l o a n ,  
*
c K   




1 ). The farm gains area ad when the subsidy is used to purchase fertilizer 
under a credit constraint. Subsidy  1 DS  does not change the quantity of the bank loan: with or 
without the subsidy the farm purchases the same amount of fertilizer through the bank loan, 
*
c K . With subsidy  1 DS , the farm is still credit constrained ( 0 > c λ ) – the amount of fertilizer 
*
1 cs K  i s  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  f e r t i l i z e r  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  u s e d  i n  a  p e r f e c t  m a r k e t  
* K , 
* *
1 K Kcs <  –  a n d  t h u s  i t  i s  p r o f i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  f a r m  to exploit fully all available financing 
opportunities (subsidies and loans).  
Yet if the subsidy is sufficiently high, it can reduce the amount of bank loans. For example, 
with subsidy  2 DS , where  1
* *
2 DS K K DS c > − > , the supply of fertilizer shifts to  s k BF 2 K S , 
where  k DS C SK ) ( 2 2 + =  (Figure 3). The equilibrium fertilizer use changes to 
* K : 
*
2 s K   




s K K −  is financed with the bank loan. Now, 
                                                        
4 I n  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  t y p e  o f  c o l l a t e r a l  m a y  a f f e c t  t h e  cost of the loan. For example, if banks perceive 
subsidies to be more secure or if they have lower transaction costs for administering them than other 
types of farm collateral, then the interest rate may be lower for subsidy-backed loans than for loans 
backed by the other types of collateral. In this case, the effects will be similar as those shown in Figure 
2.  6 | CIAIAN & POKRIVCAK 
 





s K K − , which is less than the total amount of fertilizer financed through a bank loan 
without subsidy 
*
c K . Relative to a situation of no subsidy, the farm’s gain is the area abde. 
Intuitively, subsidy  2 DS  eliminates the credit constraint (i.e. the credit constraint 0 is not 
binding with  2 DS ,  0 = c λ ) and the farm substitutes some of the expensive bank loans with 
cheaper subsidies. With subsidy  2 DS , the farm is not credit constrained and it uses the same 
amount of fertilizer as under the perfect market situation, 
* K . 
Finally, we consider the situation with a binding credit constraint when the subsidy is paid at 
the end of the season,  0 = α .  
Hypothesis 3: If farms are credit constrained and if subsidies are paid at the end of the 
season, the farm increases its bank loans.  
The graphical analysis for this hypothesis is in Figure 4. The fertilizer supply without the 
subsidy and with the credit constraint is  c k A K S  and the equilibrium fertilizer use is 
*
c K . If 
the credit constraint 0 is binding ( 0 > c λ ), it is profitable for the farm to use the subsidy DS 
paid at the end of the season ( 0 = α ) as collateral for obtaining a bank loan for the purchase 
of fertilizer at the beginning of the season. Hence, because of more collateral, subsidies 
increase bank loans from  ) (W C  to  ) ( DS W C + , where  ) ( ) ( DS W C W C + < . The availability 
of more loans shifts the fertilizer supply to  c k B 1 K S  and the equilibrium fertilizer use to 
*
1 c K , 
where 
* *
1 c c K K > . Relative to the situation with no subsidy, the farm benefits from more loans; 
the gain is equal to area a. Note that for a sufficiently high level of subsidy, the farm may 
become credit unconstrained (i.e.  0 = c λ ). For example, this is the case when the subsidy 
shifts the fertilizer supply to  c k D 2 K S , which increases the equilibrium use to 
* K  and 
generates a gain for the farm equal to area ab. 
3.2  Extension: Long-term loans 
In general, farms use long-term loans to finance long-term investments that generate a multi-
annual income stream. The impact of decoupled subsidies on long-term loans is similar to 
that in the case of short-term loans.5 If subsidies are received at the beginning of the season, 
they may be used to finance farm investments. If subsidies are allocated at the end of the 
season, they may alter loans only by affecting farm collateral value. Hence, all three 
hypotheses in the previous section also hold for long-term loans.  
Still, expectations about the continuation of the CAP affect the ability of farmers to use 
subsidies for obtaining long-term loans. If market agents (particularly banks) perceive CAP 
payments to be unstable and subject to change, this may reduce their incentive to provide 
loans collateralised by subsidies. Since its inception the CAP has been reformed several 
times, changing both the type of instrument and the level of support. In this respect, two 
kinds of policy risks are present: a reduction/change in the level of a given instrument and a 
c h a n g e  i n  t h e  t y p e  o f  i n s t r u m e n t  t h r o u g h  w h ich support is allocated to farms. The first 
element reduces the availability of funds allocated to farmers and thus reduces the possibility 
to obtain subsidy-collateralised loans. The second one determines the degree of risk and the 
transaction costs of using subsidies as collateral, because different instruments may have 
different eligibility costs and may be conditional on predefined farm performance – thereby 
                                                        
5 Although the interest rate may differ between the short- and the long-term loans, the intuition is the 
same for both cases. DO AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES CROWD OUT OR STIMULATE RURAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS? | 7 
 
potentially requiring the monitoring of farm activities and being susceptible to productivity 
risk. 
4.  Econometric specification 
Theoretically, the impact of a decoupled subsidy on agricultural loans is ambiguous. 
Agricultural subsidies paid at the end of the season have no impact on bank loans in perfect 
markets while they reduce bank loans when paid at the beginning of the season. Under a 
credit constraint, subsidies paid at the beginning of the season have no impact on bank loans 
if they are sufficiently small but they reduce bank loans if they are sufficiently high. 
Furthermore, under a credit constraint, when subsidies are paid at the end of the season they 
reduce bank loans. The relationship between subsidies and bank loans is therefore an 
empirical question.  
Solving the maximisation problem (equations 0-0), the amount of farm loans depends on a 
farm’s subsidy, profitability and assets. We therefore estimate the following econometric 
model:  
  jt jt x jt a jt ds jt X assets DS loan ε β β β β β π + + Π + + + = 0  (14)
 
where subscripts j and t represent farm and time, respectively; loan stands for farm bank 
loans,  assets are farm assets and  jt X  is a vector of observable covariates, such as farm 
characteristics, regional and time variables. As usual,  jt ε  is the residual term.6  
We are especially interested in estimating the parameter  ds β , which measures the impact of 
subsidies on bank loans. A statistically significant and negative value of the coefficient 
confirms either hypothesis 1 (subsidies paid at the beginning of the season reduce bank loans 
because farms are not credit constrained) or hypothesis 2(b) (sufficiently high subsidies paid 
at the beginning of the season eliminate bank loans when farms are credit constrained). A 
statistically significant and positive coefficient confirms hypothesis 3 (farms are credit 
constrained and subsidies are paid at the end of the season). Finally, if the coefficient is not 
statistically significant, then hypothesis 2(a) holds (farms with subsidies remain credit 
constrained and subsidies have no effect on farm loans).  
We expect that data will confirm either hypothesis 2 or 3 because there is overwhelming 
evidence that farms are credit constrained (Carter, 1988;  Blancard et al., 2006; Lee and 
Chambers, 1986; Färe, Grosskopf and Lee, 1990). In addition, anecdotal evidence indicates 
that subsidies tend to be paid at the end of the season,7 which implies that hypothesis 3 
should hold. This is particularly the case for long-term loans, which tend to finance 
investments with a higher value, than for short-term loans.8 Hence, the annual value of 
farms’ subsidies may not cover the full costs of the long-term investments even if they are 
received at the beginning of the season. Hypothesis 3 is more likely to hold in the case of 
long-term loans.  
The estimation of equation 0 is subject to the omitted variable bias and particularly to 
endogeneity. There are unobservable characteristics, such as the farmer’s ability, that affect 
bank loans and may be correlated with explanatory variables. Ignoring this unobserved farm 
heterogeneity would bias the results. We use panel data and estimate a fixed-effects model, 
which helps us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity component that remains fixed 
                                                        
6 The definition of the rest of the variables is the same as in the theoretical section. 
7 There is no available consistent data on the timing of CAP subsidies. 
8 In a perfect market situation, the price of an investment good is the present value of the future 
returns from the investment good, which tends to be higher than the price of a variable input (e.g. 
fertilizer). The price of a variable input is determined by its annual marginal contribution to the farm’s 
profitability.  8 | CIAIAN & POKRIVCAK 
 
over time, thus considerably reducing the problem of omitted variable bias. To control for 
endogeneity, we estimate the generalised method of moment (GMM) model. 
4.1  Fixed-effects model 
The following estimation of a fixed-effects model implies the specification, 
  jt jt x jt a jt ds j jt X assets DS b loan ε β β β β β π + + Π + + + + = 0  (15)
 
where  j b  is the fixed effects for farm  j , which capture time-unvarying, farm-specific 
characteristics. These fixed effects represent farm heterogeneity. For example, they could 
reflect different technologies for different farms, or they could reflect diverse managerial 
skills or other unobservable, fixed, farm-specific characteristics. 
4.2  Endogeneity 
Three sources of endogeneity might bias our estimates. If subsidies were assigned to farms 
randomly, then parameter  ds β  would measure the impact of subsidies on bank loans. In 
reality, however, subsidies are not assigned randomly to farms. For example, the coupled 
animal and crop subsidies depend on regional and farm-level productivities. The coupled 
subsidies are allocated to each member state based on regional productivities (e.g. the 
regional reference yield). At the farm level, the amount of the subsidies depends on the size of 
the member state (i.e. regional productivity) and on the farm’s crop choice (e.g. supported 
versus non-supported crops). A similar situation holds for the Single Area Payment Scheme 
(SAPS) in the new member states. Although the SAPS is not directly based on farm 
productivities, it is nevertheless correlated with the pre-accession average country/regional 
productivities, because the base for the CAP application in new member state was the average 
production level and intensity in the pre-accession period. This implies that the SAPS is 
exogenous at the farm level within each new member state but endogenous among the new 
member states. The decoupled Single Payment Scheme (SPS) payments depend on the 
previous coupled payments and on the average country/regional productivities, because the 
value of the SPS was set based on regional productivities or the past level of farm subsidies 
(or both). The coupled payments of the Rural Development Programme (RDP) are allocated 
to farmers based on project submission. Only those farms that submit and have a successful 
project are granted the support. Hence the RDP is non-random because farms self-select to 
participate and only those with the best projects (likely the more productive farms) are 
granted RDP support. This structure of coupled and decoupled CAP subsidies implies that 
they are endogenous variables reflecting the characteristics of country/regional land and 
farmers’ behaviour. As such, subsidies are not assigned randomly, which implies that subsidy 
payments are correlated with the error term. Consequently, the resulting standard estimates 
of  ds β  may be biased. 
To address this source of endogeneity, we employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) robust, two-
step GMM estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that lagged endogenous variables 
are valid instruments in a panel data setting. Thi s  a l l o w s  u s  t o  u s e  l a g g e d  l e v e l s  o f  t h e  
endogenous variables as instruments (in addition to exogenous variables), after the equation 
has been first-differenced to eliminate the farm-specific effects. The GMM estimator is 
particularly suitable for datasets with a large number of cross-sections and few periods, and it 
requires that there is no autocorrelation. The FADN dataset matches these requirements, 
because it consists of panel data and contains a very large number of farm-level observations 
relative to the period covered. Given that the robust two-step GMM standard errors can be 
severely downward-biased, we use the Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust variances. DO AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES CROWD OUT OR STIMULATE RURAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS? | 9 
 
5.  Data and variable construction 
The main source of the data used in the empirical analysis is the FADN, which is compiled 
and maintained by the European Commission. The FADN is a European system of sample 
surveys that take place each year and collect structural and accountancy data on the farms. In 
total there is information about 150 variables on farm structure and yield, output, costs, 
subsidies and taxes, income, balance sheet and financial indicators. Sample sizes vary from 
country to country (roughly between 500 and 20,000 observations, with those in most 
countries ranging from 1,500 to 10,000) representing a population of around 5,000,000 
farms, covering approximately 90% of the total utilised agricultural area (UAA) and 
accounting for more than 90% of the total agricultural production. The aggregate FADN data 
are publicly available. Farm-level data are confidential, however, and for the purposes of this 
study, accessed under a special agreement.  
To our knowledge, the FADN is the only source of micro-economic data that is harmonised 
(the bookkeeping principles are the same across all EU member states) and it is 
representative of the commercial agricultural holdings across the entire EU. Holdings are 
selected to take part in the survey on the basis of sampling plans established at the level of 
each region in the EU. The survey does not cover all the agricultural holdings in the Union, 
but only those that are of a size allowing them to rank as commercial holdings. 
The FADN data is a panel dataset, which means that farms that stay in the panel in 
consecutive years can be traced over time using a unique identifier. In this study we use panel 
data for 1995–2007 covering all EU member states except Romania and Bulgaria. Romania 
and Bulgaria were excluded from the sample because for these countries the data were 
available for only one year (2007). 
A description of the variables constructed is presented in Table 1. All variables except for 
ratios are calculated per hectare of UAA to reduce the potential problem of 
heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables in equation 0 – total loans, long-term loans and 
short-term loans – are constructed from the FADN data by dividing the total long-/medium-
term and the short-term loans, respectively, by the total utilised agricultural area.  
Similarly, all subsidy variables (sub_total_ha,  sub_decoupled_ha,  sub_coupled_ha) are 
constructed from the FADN data and are calculated on a per-hectare basis. Every agricultural 
producer in the FADN survey is asked to report the total subsidies received as well as to 
specify the amount by major subsidy type. Decoupled subsidies, sub_decoupled_ha, include 
SPS and SAPS payments. Coupled subsidies, sub_coupled_ha, include payments linked to 
farm inputs or outputs, such as crop area payments, animal payments and the RDP. The total 
subsidies variable, sub_total_ha, is the sum of coupled and decoupled CAP subsidies. The 
independent variables assets and income_ha represent the value of farm assets and farm 
cash flow calculated on a per-hectare basis.  
The covariates matrix  jt X  includes other explanatory variables that affect farm loans. The 
land rented ratio and labour own ratio are included in the equations to control for potential 
differences in incentives between own and rented/hired land/labour as well as to account for 
the higher costs incurred by farms using rented/hired land/labour. A variable capturing the 
economic size (farm size) of the farms is also available from the FADN data. The economic 
size of farms is expressed in European size units. To account for the various technological, 
sectoral and regional covariates, we include variables representing effects such as irrigated 
land, area under glass, fallow land and sectoral, regional and time dummies (for more details 
see Table 1).  10 | CIAIAN & POKRIVCAK 
 
6.  Preliminary results 
The results are reported in Table 2 for total farm loans (columns 1-3), for long-term farm 
loans (columns 4-6) and for short-t e r m  f a r m  l o a n s  ( c o l u m n s  7 - 9 ) . 9 In addition to the 
complete equation specification 0, we add an interaction variable between subsidies and farm 
size (models 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9) and the square value of subsidies (models 3, 6 and 9) to 
account for an indirect and non-linear relationship between subsidies and loans. 
The model-adjusted R2s range from 0.10 to 0.49. The most consistently significant variables 
(prob(t) < 0.10) across all models are assets (assets_ha), the trend variable (year), the own 
labour ratio (labor_own_ratio) and the rented land ratio (land_rented_ratio).  
The estimated results suggest that subsidies influence farm loans but the effects are indirect 
and non-linear. The coefficient for subsidies in models 1, 4 and 7, where only a linear subsidy 
term is used, is not statistically significant for all types of loans. When interacting subsidies 
with farm size (models 2 and 5), however, its coefficient is statistically significant but only for 
total loans and for long-term loans. At the same time, the coefficient associated with the 
linear subsidy term sub_total_ha (the direct effect) is statistically significant and takes a 
negative value. This indicates that subsidies stimulate farm loans but only for larger farms, 
whereas the direct impact of subsidies has a reducing effect on total and long-term loans 
(models 2 and 5). For the short-term loans (model 8), neither of the coefficients (i.e. for the 
interaction variable and the linear term sub_total_ha) is significant. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the relationship between subsidies and loans is non-
linear. A small value of subsidies per hectare reduces bank loans (the coefficient for 
sub_total_ha is negative and significant in models 3 and 6) and as the value of subsidies 
increases farms use more bank loans (the coefficient for the squared value of subsidies 
sub_total_ha_sq is positive and significant in models 3 and 6). Again, this only holds for 
total loans and for long-term loans. The short-term loans are not affected by subsidies, which 
is also the case when the non-linear relationship is considered (model 9).  
These results indicate that hypothesis 3 holds for the total and the long-term loans, whereby 
subsidies increase farm collateral and thus farm loan use. The multi-annual character of the 
long-term investments allows the use of subsidies by credit-constrained farms to finance 
investments only through loans. For the short-term loans, the estimated results suggest the 
validity of hypothesis 2(a). Yet this does not imply that farms are not credit constrained with 
respect to short-term loans. Farms may still be credit constrained and may use subsidies to 
finance short-term inputs either because they receive them at the beginning of the growing 
season or because they may use other informal sources that may be subsidy-collateralised. 
On the other hand, the difference in the statistical significance between the long-term and the 
short-term loans may indicate that farms may prefer to use subsidies to finance long-term 
investments and not short-term ones possibly because of the presence of a greater credit 
constraint in the former type of investment than in the latter one.  
In Table 3 we disaggregate subsidies in coupled (sub_coupled_ha) and decoupled 
(sub_decoupled_ha) payments and again estimate their impact on total loans (columns 1-3), 
long-term loans (columns 4-6) and short-term loans (columns 7-9). The results indicate the 
important differences these two types of payments have on farm loans. For the long-tem 
loans (models 4-6), the effects are similar to those shown in Table 2 where long-term loans 
(models 4-6) were regressed over aggregated subsidies. Both coupled and decoupled 
subsidies have an indirect (by stimulating more loans among large farms than among small 
ones) and non-linear impact on long-term loans.  
For the short-term loans, the effects of disaggregated subsidies (Table 3) differ with respect 
to the results reported in Table 2. The short-term loans are affected only by decoupled 
payments. Nevertheless, the direct effect (the coefficient for sub_decoupled_ha in model 9) 
                                                        
9 We estimate fixed-effects models with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. DO AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES CROWD OUT OR STIMULATE RURAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS? | 11 
 
is positive and significant, whereas the interaction term (the coefficient for 
sub_decoupled_fsize in model 9) is negative and significant. These results suggest that the 
decoupled subsidies are used as collateral to increase farm loans, but that this is more 
important for small farms than for large farms. The coupled payments do not affect the short-
term loans: i.e. the coefficients for the variables sub_coupled_ha, sub_coupled_ha_sq and 
sub_coupled_fsize are not statistically significant in model 9.  
The results in Table 3 confirm that hypothesis 3 tends to hold for the long-term loans for 
both types of CAP payments. For the short-term loans, only the decoupled payments imply 
the validity of hypothesis 3, whereas the estimated effects for the coupled payments suggest 
that hypothesis 2(a) may better represent reality.  
The GMM estimates are shown in Table 4. Generally, the GMM results indicate different 
results compared with those reported for the fixed-effects model. When controlling for 
endogeneity, the importance of subsidies in determining both long-term and short-term 
loans reduces significantly. Only the decoupled payments affect loans and the relationship is 
non-linear. A small value of subsidies does not affect the loans (the coefficients for 
sub_decoupled_ha and sub_coupled_ha are not significant in models 2 and 3, nor in models 
4 and 6) and as the value of subsidies increases farms use more bank loans (the coefficient for 
the squared value of subsidies sub_coupled_ha_sq is positive and significant in models 3 
and 6). This holds for both types of loans.  
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have estimated the impact the CAP subsidies on farm bank loans. First, we 
have theoretically analysed the demand for farm loans by farmers under perfect and 
imperfect credit-market assumptions. In the empirical analysis, we have used farm-level 
panel data from the FADN to test the theoretical predictions. 
According to the theoretical results, subsidies may increase bank loans, reduce them or have 
n o  i m p a c t  o n  b a n k  l o a n s  d e pending on whether farms are credit constrained, whether 
subsidies are allocated at the beginning or at the end of the growing season, and on the 
relative cost of internal and external financing. If the external financing is more expensive 
than the internal financing, subsidies affect bank loans even if farms are not constrained with 
respect to external financing. This is the case when subsidies are paid at the beginning of the 
season and thus allows farms to substitute loans with cheaper subsidies. In the presence of 
credit constraints, farms have an incentive to expand the internal or external financing (or 
both) to invest in constrained inputs. If subsidies are paid to farmers at the beginning of the 
season, farms may use them directly to purchase inputs with no effect on bank loans. If 
subsidies are substantial, however, they may eliminate the farms’ credit constraints and may 
crowd out more expensive bank loans. On the other hand, if subsidies are received at the end 
of the season, farms cannot use them directly to finance inputs. Instead, they may use 
subsidies as collateral to obtain more bank loans, thus increasing the availability of external 
financing for inputs at the beginning of the season. 
We employ the fixed-effects and GMM models to estimate the impact of subsidies on farm 
loans. The estimated results suggest that subsidies have the following effects on the use of 
farm loans:  
i)  Subsidies influence farm loans and the effects tend to be non-linear and indirect.  
ii)  Coupled subsidies affect short- and long-term loans in a different way from decoupled 
subsidies.  
iii)  Both coupled and decoupled subsidies stimulate long-term farm loans. But the long-
term loans of large farms increase more than those of small farms, owing to decoupled 
subsidies.  12 | CIAIAN & POKRIVCAK 
 
iv)  Short-term loans are only affected by decoupled subsidies. At the same time, decoupled 
subsidies increase the short-term loans of small farms more than they do those of large 
farms.  
v)  When controlling for endogeneity, the importance of subsidies in determining both the 
long- and short-term loans reduces significantly. Only the decoupled payments affect 
loans and the relationship is non-linear.  
vi)  In general, our empirical results indicate that hypothesis 3 holds for the decoupled 
payments, whereas coupled payments are found not to affect loans. 
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Table 1. Description of variables  
Variable name  Description 
Dependent variables 
Total loans  Long, medium and short-term loans per UAA 
Long-term loans  Long- and medium-term loans per UAA 
Short-term loans  Short-term loans per UAA 
Explanatory variables 
sub_total_ha  Hectare value of farm subsidies  
sub_coupled_ha  Hectare value of all coupled subsidies on crops, livestock and livestock 
products and RDP 
sub_decoupled_ha  Hectare value of SPS and SAPS 
sub_total_ha_sq  Square value of subsidies 
sub_coupled_ha_sq  Square value of coupled subsidies 
sub_decoupled_ha_sq  Square value of decoupled subsidies 
sub_total_fsize  Interaction variable between subsidies and total loans (=sub_total_ha * 
farm size) 
sub_coupled_fsize  Interaction variable between coupled subsidies and total loans 
(=sub_coupled _ha * farm size) 
sub_decoupled_fsize  Interaction variable between decoupled subsidies and total loans 
(=sub_decoupled _ha * farm size) 
assets_ha  Hectare value of farm assets 
income_net_ha  Cash flow: farm revenues from production sales minus payments for 
inputs (excluding depreciation and interest costs) 
income_net_ha_l  Lagged value of income_net_ha 
year Trend  variable 
land_rented_ratio  Ratio of rented area to UAA 
labor_own_ratio  Ratio of unpaid input to total labour 
Farm size  Economic size of holding expressed in European size units (ESU) 
irrigated_land  Ratio of irrigated land to UAA 
glass_land  Ratio of the area under glass or plastic land to UAA 
land_unused_ratio  Ratio of fallow and set-aside land to UAA 
land_woodland_ratio  Ratio of woodland area to UAA 
output_livestock_ratio  Ratio of total livestock output to total farm output 
output_owncons_ratio  Ratio of farmhouse consumption and farm use to total output 
lu_ha  Total livestock units per UAA 
Note: All variables are calculated from the FADN data. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 20 | ŠTEFAN BOJNEC 
 
Table 2. Fixed-effects estimates of loans (total subsidies) 
  Total loans  Long-term loans  Short-term loans 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
sub_total_ha 0.0656  -0.995**  -1.075*** 0.0762 -1.943***  -1.662*** 0.00813  -0.142  -0.142 
sub_total_ha_sq  –  – 0.000143** –  – 0.000164** –  –  -7.02e-07 
sub_total_fsize –  0.142*  0.0967  –  0.255** 0.158**  –  0.0204 0.0206 
assets_ha 0.418***  0.418*** 0.419*** 0.406*** 0.406*** 0.407***  0.0522*** 0.0521*** 0.0521*** 
income_net_ha 0.246  0.246  0.247  0.301  0.302 0.303  -0.0726*  -0.0726*  -0.0726* 
income_net_ha_l -0.136  -0.136  -0.135  -0.149 -0.148 -0.147  0.000462  0.000466  0.000463 
year 24.94**  24.94**  25.59**  19.89**  19.81** 20.66**  -7.654***  -7.664***  -7.667*** 
farm  size  85.82 28.93 48.96 99.07 0.353 40.88 17.50 9.233 9.125 
labor_own_ratio -251.4***  -249.8***  -256.5***  -253.1** -253.1** -260.0**  -51.85 -51.54 -51.50 
land_rented_ratio 3,780**  3,778** 3,779** 3,258** 3,251** 3,253**  470.0*** 470.0*** 470.0*** 
land_unused_ratio 297.1  279.2 279.9 200.5 175.1  179.4 -70.19  -72.55  -72.62 
land_woodland_ratio -2,209***  -2,166*** -2,148*** -2,598** -2,546** -2,529**  -179.9*  -173.4  -173.5 
output_livestock_ratio -3.075 -3.078 -2.473  1.655  1.843  2.441 -4.268  -4.270 -4.272 
output_owncons_ratio 436.9  436.4  448.5  436.7 439.9 451.7*  -43.92  -44.00  -44.09 
irrigated_land -13.49  -13.45  -13.01 32.17 32.65 39.00 5.168 5.170 5.169 
glass_land 28.15  28.16  30.58*  49.48***  50.20*** 52.75***  -9.384*  -9.382*  -9.395* 
yield_wheat -0.194**  -0.195**  -0.190**  -0.236*** -0.234*** -0.230*** 0.0405**  0.0405**  0.0405** 
lu_ha 91.61  91.28  90.70  34.18  33.57 32.81  48.59**  48.57**  48.58** 
Constant -54,495**  -54,088**  -55,396** -44,250** -43,310** -45,192** 15,011*** 15,091*** 15,098*** 
           
Observations  237372 237372 237372 195496 195496 195496 206108 206108 206108 
R-squared  0.489 0.489 0.490 0.484 0.484 0.485 0.106 0.106 0.106 
Number of idn  60904  60904  60904  51360 51360 51360 54382 54382 54382 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ compilation. AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL LABOUR MARKETS IN THE THREE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES | 21 
 
Table 3. Fixed-effects estimates of loans (disaggregated subsidies) 
  Total loans  Long-term loans  Short-term loans 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
sub_decoupled_ha -0.0325  -2.712*** -2.182**  0.131  -6.451***  -5.383*** -0.164***  1.120***  1.183*** 
sub_decoupled_ha_sq –  – -0.000383  –  –  -0.000878*  –  –  -8.10e-05 
sub_decoupled_fsize  –  0.339**  0.260 – 0.801*** 0.676***  –  -0.153***  -0.155*** 
sub_coupled_ha 0.0696  -0.945**  -1.046*** 0.0740  -1.731** -1.450*** 0.0139  -0.196  -0.198 
sub_coupled_ha_sq –  –  0.000142**  – –  0.000162**  –  –  -2.63e-06 
sub_coupled_fsize –  0.136*  0.0960  – 0.229**  0.136**  –  0.0282  0.0297 
assets_ha 0.418***  0.418*** 0.419***  0.406***  0.406***  0.407*** 0.0521*** 0.0522*** 0.0522*** 
income_net_ha 0.247  0.247  0.247  0.301  0.302 0.303  -0.0718*  -0.0717* -0.0718* 
income_net_ha_l -0.136  -0.135  -0.135  -0.149 -0.148  -0.147  0.000671  0.000783  0.000758 
year 27.46*  28.34*  26.50*  18.55  20.71 18.22  -3.072  -3.549* -3.809* 
farm size  84.51  15.31  38.08  99.77 -26.67  16.71  15.01  17.02  16.87 
labor_own_ratio -252.3***  -243.6***  -251.3***  -252.7** -232.3**  -239.1**  -54.60  -60.46*  -60.39* 
land_rented_ratio 3,779**  3,779**  3,781** 3,258**  3,258** 3,261**  469.0***  468.2***  467.9*** 
land_unused_ratio 292.3  275.0 276.2  204.1  177.2  185.8  -81.02  -91.46  -91.89 
land_woodland_ratio -2,208***  -2,146**  -2,129**  -2,598** -2,556**  -2,544**  -176.4* -190.4*  -191.1* 
output_livestock_ratio -2.842  -2.693 -2.154 1.535  2.463 3.166  -3.852  -4.012  -4.002 
output_owncons_ratio 448.2  443.1 445.3  430.9 427.0  426.8  -9.337  -0.244  -1.678 
irrigated_land -13.71  -14.51 -14.00  34.17  25.43  30.25  5.128  5.680  5.685 
glass_land 24.32*  25.83*  32.41**  51.57***  55.21*** 64.12***  -15.99***  -17.37*** -16.98*** 
yield_wheat -0.187**  -0.189**  -0.191**  -0.239*** -0.242***  -0.247***  0.0532*** 0.0551***  0.0545*** 
lu_ha 91.60  91.32  90.68  34.19  33.70 32.86  48.60**  48.46** 48.47** 
Constant -59,533*  -60,790*  -57,152*  -41,584 -44,903  -40,130  5,857 6,794  7,310* 
                  
Observations 237372  237372 237372  195496  195496  195496 206108  206108  206108 
R-squared 0.489  0.489  0.490  0.484 0.484  0.485  0.106  0.107  0.107 
Number of idn  60904  60904  60904  51360 51360  51360  54382  54382  54382 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 22 | ŠTEFAN BOJNEC 
 
Table 4. Arellano and Bond estimates of loans (disaggregated subsidies) 
  Long-term loans  Short-term loans 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
sub_decoupled_ha 2.434***  -4.792 0.294  0.328  -0.677  -0.415 
sub_coupled_ha 2.471***  -1.644  -0.214 0.279 -0.101  -0.189 
sub_decoupled_fsize –  0.861**  –  –  0.118  – 
sub_coupled_fsize –  0.482  –  –  0.0449  – 
sub_decoupled_ha_sq –  –  -0.000630 –  –  0.000792 
sub_coupled_ha_sq –  –  0.000317*** –  –  0.000185*** 
assets_ha 0.214***  0.216***  0.215*** 0.0427***  0.0396***  0.0429*** 
income_net_ha 0.468***  0.477***  0.431*** 0.0628** 0.0511*  0.0489* 
investment_ha 0.766***  0.756***  0.747*** -0.0786 -0.0593  -0.0579 
L.investment_ha 0.243***  0.242***  0.260*** 0.0797***  0.0886***  0.0782*** 
a26 -82.65***  -292.0**  -83.61*** -13.58  -41.48  -16.61 
labor_own_ratio -90.20  -74.66  -86.22 -54.90 -45.12  -49.75 
land_rented_ratio 1,760***  1,690***  1,617*** 281.5***  275.8*** 294.3*** 
land_unused_ratio 416.1***  397.7*** 210.4*  -75.45  -88.65 -73.07 
land_woodland_ratio -4,758***  -3,836*** -3,190***  -151.6 -131.5  -123.8 
output_livestock_ratio 13.87  14.68  14.46  0.304  0.450  -0.0605 
output_owncons_ratio 545.7***  441.0*** 519.2***  48.86  43.17  60.15 
irrigated_land -192.7 -193.7 -219.0  -17.68  -29.78  -36.60 
glass_land 59.32***  60.47***  46.79*** 1.185  1.128  0.925 
yield_wheat -0.258***  -0.270***  -0.267***  -0.0196  -0.0228  -0.00653 
lu_ha 167.0***  151.3**  175.9***  35.31  41.42  33.86 
L.loan_total_ha_adj –  –  –  –  –  – 
L2.loan_total_ha_adj –  –  –  –  –  – 
L.loan_long_run_ha_adj -0.0368*  -0.0298  -0.0357*  –  –  – 
L2.loan_long_run_ha_adj -0.0407***  -0.0436***  -0.0269*  –  –  – 
L.loan_short_run_ha_adj – – –  0.146***  0.160***  0.141*** 
L2.loan_short_run_ha_adj –  –  –  -0.0233  -0.0233  -0.0305 
Constant -1,948***  -172.0  -907.7*** -94.81  142.6  72.89 
             
Observations 92328  92328  92328  95448  95448  95448 
Number of idn  26792  26792 26792  28380  28380  28380 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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